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an entangled history
this paper aims to analyze the relationship between the communist 
state security and the most sizeable ethnic minority in romania, the 
1, 5 million hungarian community of transylvania . the subject of my 
study is not entirely new, since a number of valuable books, articles 
and research papers have been published so far concerning the fate of 
romania’s minorities under the ceaușescu regime .1 these contribu-
tions have considerably broadened our knowledge of the discrimina-
1  the hungarian-language bibliography on this issue is too large to be mentioned 
here . a good historiographical assessment in Balázs t r e n c s é n y i  et al .: nationalizing 
minorities and homeland Politics . the case of the hungarians in romania . In: nation-
Building and contested Identities . romanian and hungarian case Studies . Budapest, Iași 
2001; a balanced account in robert r . K i n g : minorities under communism . nationalities 
as a Source of tension among Balkan communist States . cambridge/ma 1973; i d e m : 
a history of the romanian communist Party . Stanford/ca 1980 . a more revendicative 
stance in George S c h ö p f l i n : Witnesses to cultural Genocide . firsthand reports on 
rumania’s minority Policies . new York 1979; and elemér I l l y é s : national minorities 
in romania: change in transylvania . new York 1982 (east european monographs); 
for a comparation of the situation of the hungarian minorities after 1918 see Stephen 
B o r s o d y : the hungarians: a Divided nation . new haven 1988 (east european 
monographs); and the most recent and comprehensive synthesis: minority hungarian 
communities in the twentieth century . eds . nándor B á r d i , csilla f e d i n e c , lászló 
S z a r k a  . new York 2011; among the German-language works still useful Ottmar K o -
l a r : rumänien und seine nationalen minderheiten: 1918 bis heute . Wien 1997; among 
the post-1989 romanian contributions, one worth mentioning the two-volume series by 
andrea a n d r e e s c u , lucian n a s t a s ă , andrea V a r g a : minorităţi etnoculturale . ma-
ghiarii din românia [ethnic minorities . hungarians of romania] 1945-1955 . centrul de 
resurse pentru Diversitatea etnoculturală . cluj-napoca 2002; minorităţi etnoculturale . 
maghiarii din românia [ethnic minorities . hungarians of romania] 1955-1968 . centrul 
de resurse pentru Diversitatea etnoculturală . cluj-napoca 2003 .
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tive policies carried out towards ethnic minorities by the romanian 
communist system, touching upon relevant topics such as postwar 
deportation and resettlement, social deprivation following the nation-
alization campaign, linguistic rights, religious freedom, and migration 
to the West . as Walker connor and martin mevius have pointed out 
in their large-scale comparative analysis of communist nationalities 
policies during the cold War, a basic contradiction affected the inter-
play between ideology (the marxist-leninist theoretical premise) and 
practice that is the compromise between internationalist utopia and re-
alpolitik . In the postwar context, this meant a widely shared agreement 
between the various political parties on the necessity to “nationalize” 
the multiethnic territories of central europe by removing undesirable 
minorities .2 my research aims to put the majority-minority relation 
in a State security perspective, helping to understand the historical 
importance for the internal evolution of the romanian communist 
regime and its relation system with the hungarian community of two 
major crises generated by external events, such as the 1956 hungarian 
revolution and the 1968 Prague Spring .
to understand the Securitate’s policy towards the largest minority 
in romania, it is very important to place the events into a new inter-
pretative context . earlier works on romania’s minority policy under 
Gheorghiu-Dej and ceaușescu focused almost exclusively on human 
rights’ violations committed by the communist regime, and down-
played the active role of the minority communities . new scholarship 
recently published in romania and Germany3 demonstrates, however, 
2  Walker c o n n o r : the national Question in marxist-leninist theory and Strat-
egy, Princeton (nJ) 1984; a good up-to-date introduction to the comparative study of 
national policies in the Soviet Bloc in martin m e v i u s : reappraising communism 
and nationalism . In: nationalities Papers . Vol . 37, no . 4, July 2009, pp . 378-400; on the 
hungarian communist Party’s approach to nationalism and the hungarian minorities, 
martin m e v i u s : agents of moscow . the hungarian communist Party and the Origins 
of Socialist Patriotism, 1941-1953 . Oxford 2005 .
3  Stejărel O l a r u , Georg h e r b s t r i t t : Stasi și Securitatea [GDr- and SSr-Intelligence 
Service] . București 2005; anca c i u c i u : acţiunea “credinciosul”: șef rabinul moses rosen 
și comunitatea evreiască în arhivele cnSaS [Operation “Believer” . chief rabbi m .r . and 
the Jewish community at the archives of cnSaS] . București 2008; acţiunea “recupe-
rarea” . Securitatea și emigrarea germanilor din românia [Operation “recuparation” . 
Securitate and the emigration of germans from romania] (1962-1989) . eds . florica D o b r e 
et al . București 2011; the most relevant works concerning the state security actions against 
the hungarian community are márton l á s z l ó : magyarhermány kronológiája [the 
chronology of magyarhermány / ro . herculian] (1944-1964) . miercurea ciuc 2008; János 
m o l n á r : Szigorúan ellenőrzött evangélium [Strictly controlled Gospel] . nagyvárad 
2009; csaba Zoltán novák: aranykorszak? a ceaușescu-rendszer magyarságpolitikája 
[Golden age? the hungarian-policy of the ceaușescu regime] 1965-1974 . csíkszereda 
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how fascinating and intricate the nationality issue was in communist 
romania . making use of previously inaccessible sources from the 
former secret police archives, these authors explore the activity of 
the security forces among and against ethnic minorities, but also the 
numerous cases of individual collaboration among the non-romanian 
elites . this new scholarship challenges the widely shared view that 
central and local romanian authorities are the only responsible for 
the mistreatment of minorities, discharging former collaborators as 
victims of an infernal mechanism . Professional historians dealing with 
ethnic relations in communist romania still deal with the pernicious 
effect of self-victimizing, traumatic collective memory elaborated by 
minority groups during the 1980s, which easily becomes a defensive 
strategy against new, unpleasant findings about the complex relational 
network between the romanian state security and the minority groups .
my paper aims at contributing to a methodological renewal of histori-
cal research on interethnic relations in transylvania by analyzing not 
only the concrete policies carried out by the romanian authorities, but 
also the behind-the-scene organizational and ideological changes af-
fecting Securitate . the fundamental shift of the romanian secret police 
from strict internationalism and class repression to open support for 
soft ethnic cleansing can be considered as one of the most interesting 
features of the most general changes the romanian communist regime 
underwent from the late 1950s onwards .
the age of State-sponsored integration
the dilemma the romanian communist party had to face after 1944 was 
common to left-wing parties of all newly established Soviet-sponsored 
“popular democracies” . On the one hand, their leaders and especially 
the rank-and-file members were not insensible to nationalist arguments . 
On the other hand, communist parties in the territories liberated/oc-
cupied by the red army had a multiethnic composition, and rejected 
“bourgeois” nationalism . external factors, such as the Soviet military 
occupation and hungary’s position as a potential ally of romania, also 
contributed to make the romanian case an exception among the post-
war eastern european nations . Stalin firmly opposed ethnic revenge 
on the defeated hungarian minority in transylvania and ordered his 
representatives to support ethnic pacification of the province . unlike 
in czechoslovakia, where the hungarians suffered for several years 
legal discrimination and forced resettlement, and similarly to Bulgaria, 
2010 .  – William t o t o k : minderheiten und Securitate . In: halbjahresschrift für süd-
osteuropäische Geschichte, literatur und Politik 23 (2011), h . 1-2 (herbst), pp . 77-110 .
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where the communist party offered cultural rights to the previously 
persecuted muslim and turk communities, romania’s first left-wing 
government led by Petru Groza proclaimed the political and social 
integration of ethnic minorities regardless of their war record . Plans 
of population exchanges with hungary involving hundred thousand 
ethnic hungarians from transylvania had been issued in 1945-46 by 
the Office for Peace preparation of the ministry of external affairs, 
but were never implemented due to Soviet opposition . Interethnic 
violence in postwar transylvania did occur against the hungarian 
and the ukrainian minority, but retribution did not become the pat-
tern of romanian minority policy . the only relevant exception to this 
integrative stance was the harsh punishment inflicted to the German 
minority, who was proclaimed collectively guilty of collaboration with 
nazi Germany . In January 1945, a deportation campaign affected some 
70,000 ethnic German civilians – ca . 15% of transylvania’s German 
population according to 1941 data – who suffered deportation from 
Satu mare, maramureș and Sălaj, Banat and transylvanian counties 
to Soviet work colonies (“reconstruction work” as an instrument of 
reparation and retribution for war damages), along with ethnic Ger-
mans from other east-european countries . the relevant operative plans 
for this were issued by the Soviet security forces according to Stalin’s 
directions .4 consistent proofs have also emerged showing the involve-
ment of romanian authorities in an act of cleansing resulting in more 
than 3,000 victims .5 nevertheless, the 1945 deportation of Swabians 
was not followed by general plans of expulsion of the whole ethnic 
German population . although transylvanian Saxons and Swabians 
were excluded from the 1945 land reform, and were condemned to 
judicial discrimination as second-class citizens until 1949, they were 
not exposed to physical annihilation .6 
Between 1945 and 1956, the integration of minority groups was gen-
erally encouraged by the romanian state . Gaining the political support 
of non-romanians in which remained, after all, a multinational entity, 
became one of the main goals of the left-wing government led by Petru 
Groza and supported by the Soviet union . a number of internal and 
4  the historical framework of post-1939 special operations carried out by Soviet 
security forces in Pavel P o l i a n : against their Will . the history and Geography of 
forced migration in the uSSr . Budapest 2004 .
5  Vladimir t i s m ă n e a n u , Dorin D o b r i n c u , cristian V a s i l e : raport final . 
comisia Prezidenţială pentru analiza Dictaturii comuniste din românia [final report . 
an analysis of communist dictatorship in romania by the presidents’ commission] . 
București 2007, pp . 358-359 . 
6  See the well-balanced account by hannelore B a i e r  in: t i s m ă n e a n u  et al .,  op . 
cit ., pp . 355-357 . 
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external factors made the romanian-hungarian compromise possible . 
moscow wanted to achieve ethnic peace and cooperation in romania, 
and Stalin looked at transylvania as part of a broader scenario which 
included Bessarabia and northern Bukovina . as a compensation for 
the definitive loss of the two regions vindicated by the uSSr, romania 
was granted the whole transylvania under the condition that a “truly 
democratic”, pro-Soviet government was set up in Bucharest . On the 
hungarian side, the loss of northern transylvania after World War 
II was painful, but not shocking: well before the Paris peace treaty of 
february 1947 put an end to the diplomatic conflict, hungary had faced 
harsh Soviet refusal to any plans of territorial adjustments, and its war 
record of “last” nazi ally put hungary in weak position faced to roma-
nia . after some failed attempts to regain its role of external homeland 
and diplomatic helper of its diaspora, Budapest had to accomodate to 
the basic principle of bilateral relations in the Soviet sphere: minority 
issue is par excellence an internal affair and shall never be discussed in 
public . On the ground, the majority-minority relationship also went 
through major changes . after 1945, the 1, 5 million transylvanian 
hungarians, whose social, cultural and even demographic influence 
remained considerate in spite of the massive emigration of its middle 
class, accepted the compromise the romanian state offered for their 
political loyalty: political integration without any pressure for cultural 
assimilation . the romanian governments carried out with the hungar-
ians a policy resembling the leninist korenizatsia of the early 1920s . for 
almost a decade, left-wing (since 1948 Stalinist) hungarian cultural 
life was generously supported, and a full-scale educational network 
was allowed to exist throughout transylvania . this positive approach 
contrasted with the discriminative policies of the interwar period, and 
stimulated popular participation from the hungarian side, as well . the 
best expression of left-wing activism was the hungarian Popular union 
(hPu – 1944-1953), a minority organization which came to number 
half a million members (one ethnic hungarian adult out of two) and 
gaining almost 10% of national ballots and 30 parliamentary seats 
at the november 1946 partially free elections . according to scholars 
nagy mihály, Ágoston Olti and tamás lönhárt, hPu and its political 
leaders played a double and contradictory role in the transition years 
to the one-party system: they acted as a spokesman and defender of 
the hungarian interests, claiming for more integration and financial 
support to minority culture, but they represented also a trojan horse 
for the penetration of communist social radicalism into the hungar-
ian community, especially among workers and poorer peasants . most 
prominent members and rank-and-file activists of the hPu were also 
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members of the communist party, and originally combined the ethnic 
discourse and the ideological allegiance to internationalism .7 
from 1948 the communist party acted as the main integrative net-
work for the hungarian minority . this strategy went far beyond the 
ruthless application of “salami tactics” against the opposition forces 
and their own allies within the short-lived popular fronts . In a difficult 
context, such as multi-ethnic transylvania where the hungarian pres-
ence seemed to represent a direct threat to state security, a complex 
mechanism of ethnic balance and power-sharing, consciously built up 
by the Pcr with Soviet assistance from early 1945, helped the party to 
strengthen its political legitimacy among different national and social 
groups . unlike the historical romanian parties and the hungarian 
nationalists, the Pcr and the Petru Groza-led pro-communist govern-
ment behaved as a multi-ethnic entity pursuing integrative policies . 
Starting from 1948, the new communist state needed a huge number 
of politically reliable cadres of “healthy” social background . archival 
data show that preferential access to the state and party apparatus was 
granted to ethnic minorities in the 1948-52 period . Due to their number, 
the hungarians were the main beneficiaries of this policy of ethnic 
promotion . this helps to explain why in hungarian-inhabited areas 
of transylvania the popular support for the rcP and the communist 
regime was in the early 1950s considerably higher than in other roma-
nian provinces . Between 1949-53, the mostly hungarian inhabited areas 
of the Szeklerland in eastern transylvania were among the very few 
areas of the romanian countryside not to be affected by peasant revolts 
and partisan activity against the collectivization campaign . tolerance 
of the communist regime, if not proper support, was greatly helped 
by the “affirmative action” . ruthless class warfare against “kulaks”, 
the “clerical reactions” and the “remains of the bourgeoisie” there did 
not gain any ethnic connotation (the romanian state fighting against 
the hungarian peasantry), because the State officers, tax collectors, 
managers, policemen or local party secretaries, were ethnic hungar-
ian and were perceived to be closer to the local population, although 
recent scholarship (Gagyi, Oláh, novák) tend to demonstrate that they 
proved to be reliable apparatchiks rather than carriers of ethnic concerns . 
7  Érdekképviselet vagy pártpolitika? Iratok a magyar népi Szövetség történetéhez 
[representation of interests or party politics? Documents concerning the history of 
the hungarian Popular union] 1944-1953 . eds . mihály Zoltán n a g y , Ágoston O l t i  . 
csíkszereda 2009; tamás l ö n h á r t : uniunea Populară maghiară în perioada instaurării 
regimului comunist în românia [ hungarian Popular union during the implementation 
of communist rule in romania] (1944-1948) . cluj-napoca 2008 .
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One of the most interesting features of the political integration of 
the hungarian minority concerned the massive recruitment of ethnic 
hungarian officers and sub-officers into the Securitate . until 1948, 
figures on the social, ethnic and political composition of state security 
bodies – the “civil” internal intelligence (Siguranţă), the criminal in-
vestigative department handled by the Pcr (Corpul Detectivilor), and 
the highly effective military counterintelligence (Serviciul Special de 
Informaţii – SSI) – show a high degree of continuity with the pre-war 
public administration . It was reported that, after 6 march 1945, about 
40% of the 6,300 state security officers were assigned to the reserve, but 
only 195 were fired . In June 1946 the communist minister of Interior, 
teohari Georgescu, reported that despite the party’s effort to set up 
a more “reliable” and committed security force made up of former 
communist activists, over 40% of the 8,500 information officers had 
been appointed before 1944 .8 Old-style police and SSI officers, who 
had been trained during the interwar period, shared a double-faced 
attitude towards minorities . While implementing the policy of selective 
integration of democratic non-romanians into the new state offered by 
the Groza government, they maintained the traditional concern that 
minorities might represent a security threat . In the years of transition, 
the SSI and the local police corps actively monitored and persecuted 
any form of hungarian revisionism (even under the lighter form of 
calls for territorial or cultural autonomy), and also kept under strict 
surveillance the strong (and still legal) Zionist movement .9
these repressive bodies underwent a radical change only after the 
abolition of monarchy on 30 December 1947 and the subsequent for-
malization of exclusive communist rule . In august 1948 Departamen-
tul Securităţii Statului (Securitate), a Soviet modelled political police, 
replaced the Siguranţa and started harsh political repression with the 
8  Dennis D e l e t a n t : românia sub regimul comunist [romania under communist 
rule] . București 2006, p . 67 .
9  See the report issued by corpul Detectivilor from 15 June 1945 on the infiltration 
of “fascist elements” into the hungarian Popular union, the pro-communist mass 
organization of the transylvanian hungarians . arhivele naţionale ale româniei, fond 
comitetul central al Pcr, secţia organizatorică, dosar 31/1945 . Investigations against 
the hungarian minority’s activity are also reported in a n d r e e s c u  et al .: maghiarii 
din românia, op . cit .; the Groza government ambiguous approach towards the Jewish 
minority is treated in e i d  .: evreii din românia 1945-1965 [Jews of romania 1945-1965] . 
cluj-napoca, centru de resurse pentru diversitate etnoculturală 2003; see also liviu 
r o t m a n : evreii din românia în perioada comunistă [Jews of romania in the communist 
period] 1945-1965 . Iași 2004 . On the so-called “Jewish problem” in the years of transition 
of power, also see the large documentation of the Securitate archives (arhiva naţională 
pentru Studierea arhivelor Securităţii / acnSaS, fond Documentar, dosar pp . 151-164) .
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military support of nearly 70,000 security troops (Trupele Securităţii) . 
In January 1949 another military body, the Miliţia, inherited the tasks 
of the Jandarmeria, and guaranteed the police forces’ capillary presence 
in every single community in the country . Some romanian scholars 
and former Securitate officers (cosma, evgeni tanase) have argued 
that until 1952, when most Jews and a large number of hungarians 
were purged from the state security, Securitate and the higher party 
organs such as the central committee and its sections were perceived 
by the romanian majority as “alien” bodies, where ethnic hungarians, 
Jews, and ukrainians were over-represented and ruled, sometimes 
manifesting open hostility against the ethnic majority .10 compared to 
other communist countries, the romanian openness to minorities in 
such a sensitive issue may sound inexplicable . In fact, the few thousand 
Securitate officers working in the central apparatus were overwhelm-
ingly of romanian ethnic background (around 80% in 1949, nearly 
85% ten years later11) . Beside the long-standing minister of Defence, 
leontin Sălăjan (called levente Szilágyi), some ethnic hungarians 
who had belonged to the pre-war illegal rcP acceded the highest 
ranks of the early Securitate . among the others, one should mention 
the two vice-ministers appointed in 1952 by alexandru Drăghici: Ion 
Vinţe (János Vincze), who was also responsible for Securitate troops, 
antipartisan war) with the military rank of General mayor,12 and 
alexandru mureșanu, whose real name was lászló ady .13 Between 
1951 and 1953 mureșanu/ady was among the members of the special 
ministerial commission responsible for sentencing over 15 thousand 
citizens to forced displacement . another ethnic hungarian officer 
appointed in a key position was the cluj-born ferenc Butyka, who 
joined the Securitate after a short apprenticeship at the cadre section 
of the regional Party committee and thanks to his loyalty became 
the head of the criminal investigation central office between 1952 
10  this provoked in the late 1940s several conflicts between “romanian” institutions 
and the ethnic minorities, and also serious misunderstandings within the state security 
apparatus itself . See the documentation preserved by the mureș county branch of the 
romanian national archives (arhivele naţionale din românia, Direcţia regională 
a ministerului de afaceri Interne mureș – Regiunea autonomă maghiară 1923-1967, 
fond 594) .
11  a n d r e e s c u  et al .: maghiarii din românia, op . cit ., p . 26 . 
12  Securitatea . Structuri – cadre . Obiective și metode [Securitate . Structures – cadres . 
Objectives and methods] . eds . florica D o b r e , elis n e a g o e - P l e ș a , liviu P l e ș a  . 
Vol . 1 (1948-1967) . București 2006, p . 62 .
13  Ibidem, p . 70 .
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and 1963, where he gained a sinister fame due to his uncontrolled 
brutality .14
at the peak of mass repression, between 1949 and 1953, Securitate 
strictly followed the party’s line . What marius Oprea has called “state 
terrorism” against its own citizens targeted not only specific, albeit 
sometimes fictive “crimes” (ideological diversion, political resistance, 
personal misconduct), but also specific social groups . repression was 
given political, professional and geographic aims, obsessively motivat-
ed by security concerns . the two great repressive waves of 1949-53 and 
1958-61 primarily targeted the rural population, members of all faiths, 
former capitalists, and aristocrats . thousands of people were physi-
cally removed from their property after 1949 . It also hit people living in 
the multi-ethnic Banat region along the border with Yugoslavia, more 
than 45,000 of whom were forcibly relocated for security reasons to the 
Bărăgan Plain in June 1951 . nevertheless, political and social repression 
did not target any ethnic group in particular with the early exception 
of the Germans . hungarians were not persecuted as hungarians but 
as “former exploiters”, nationalists or “kulaks” . until 1956, hungarian 
nationalism and irredentism did not constitute a priority for romanian 
state security . In cluj region, for instance, the subunit responsible for 
internal political enemies (Serviciul III . Informaţii interne) was divided 
into six offices, and only the second one was assigned with the task 
to deal with “bourgeois parties, trotskyites, hungarian and German 
nationalists”,15 while great efforts were made to weaken the still active 
clandestine Iron Guard and to fight armed resistance in the mountains . 
the most notable exception to this was the arrest and condemnation 
of the roman catholic bishop of alba Iulia, Áron márton, who was 
sentenced to life long forced labour in 1951 along with fellow believers 
and members of the hungarian aristocracy . among the accusations, 
one finds the alleged plot machinated in 1946 under the leadership of 
márton, aimed at separating transylvania from romania .16 
the first turning point in the state security’s approach towards mi-
nority policy came in 1952, when romania, on Soviet insistence, created 
a hungarian autonomous region in the Szeklerland . the autonomous 
region reflected the Soviet leninist principles of territorial federalism; 
14  See marius O p r e a : Bastionul cruzimii . O istorie a Securităţii [Bastion of cruelty . 
a history of Securitate] (1948-1964) . Iași 2008, pp . 228-229 .
15  liviu P l e ș a : Direcţia regională de Securitate cluj (1948-1968) . Organizarea, 
personalul și direcţiile de acţiune [regional head office of the Securitate at cluj (1948-
1968) . Organization, staff and work instructions] . anuarul Institutului de Investigare 
a crimelor comunismului și memoria exilului românesc (IIccmer), 2011, p . 119 .
16  Áron márton’s trial is documented in acnSaS, fond Penal, dosar 254 .
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according to the Soviet constitution, national minorities were granted 
areas in which they could enjoy linguistic and cultural rights . the idea 
was mooted on 7 September 1951, by two Soviet advisers seconded to 
romania . after long discussions, the region’s creation was proclaimed 
by the new constitution issued on 21 September 1952 . according to 
the 1956 census, its 13,500 square km contained 731,387 inhabitants, of 
whom 565,510 (77 .3%) declared themselves to be of hungarian ethnic-
ity . In the regional capital târgu mureș (marosvásárhely), a similar 
proportion of hungarians (74%) could be found . hungarians also pro-
vided some 80% of the party leadership and public officials, including 
the communist Party first secretary (lajos csupor), the president of the 
People’s council/consiliul Popular (Pál Bugyi) and the regional head 
of the Securitate (colonel mihály Kovács, who held this position until 
the administrative reshaping of 1961) . these men, though, owed their 
first loyalty to the romanian party state and did not pursue politics on 
a national basis . colonel Kovács, for instance, had been implicated with 
other fellow officers in the execution of three peasants on 17 august 
1950, when he was leading the district office of turda, near the city 
of cluj . “autonomy” in this case did not mean self-determination: the 
hungarian autonomous region was under the same tight control as 
the other romanian provinces, and had to implement decisions taken 
by central authorities . But, at the same time, outside the hungarian 
autonomous region hungarians in positions of authority began to 
be systematically removed; while inside it hungarian could be used 
freely at all levels of administration, and several cultural institutions 
were created .17
In extreme times, such as during the far-reaching purges of 1952-53, 
following ana Pauker’s fall, a formal autonomy could even offer some 
protection from external dangers . the mass terror of “full blown” ro-
manian Stalinism spared the Szeklerland and the hungarian “titular” 
community, because the political leadership gave instructions to the 
security forces not to strike unnecessarily against ethnic hungarians 
in the newly established region . Outside of it, on the contrary, ethnic 
hungarians suffered severe consequences, as for instance in the city of 
cluj, where several hundred people were arrested under the accusation 
of “right-wing” deviationism . the ethnic composition of the regional 
branches of the Securitate in transylvania was extremely mixed until 
the late 1950s . State security officers of hungarian background (or 
Jewish-hungarian descent, who were mostly identified as hungarians) 
17  a full account of the hungarian autonomous region: Stefano B o t t o n i : Sztálin 
a székelyeknél . a magyar autonóm tartomány története [Stalin in the Szeklerland . the 
history of the hungarian autonomous region] 1952-1960 . csíkszereda 2008 .
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made up over 70% officers in the hungarian autonomous region, as 
the following chart shows:
table 1 . State security and the army’s ethnic composition in the hungarian 
autonomous region, 1956 .18
Ethnic 
background
Securitate 
operative 
staff
%
Police 
(Militia) 
total staff
%
Miliția’s 
operative 
staff 
%
Miliția 
admini-
strative 
staff 
%
Army’s 
regional 
command – 
total staff  
%
Regional 
Army’s 
command-
officers
%
hungarian 71 60 62 48,4 26   3
romanian 20 38 34,6 51 74 97
Other 
(German, 
Jew, roma)
  9   2   3,4   0,6 / /
even more significantly, hungarian-speaking Securitate officers were 
a majority in mostly hungarian-inhabited cities like Oradea and Satu 
mare, while in mixed localities such as timișoara, Brașov and arad 
their percentage started to decline quite early . as for the “civil” police, 
called miliţia, and the local army commands, these always showed 
a preference for ethnic romanian cadres . nevertheless, the new system 
was effective in the stimulation of “civic” loyalty towards popular-
democratic romania . hungarian-born officers tended to speak the 
state’s official language while on duty and in their private lives, and 
even when speaking their mother tongue they could not forget the 
(romanian) context in which they were operating . cluj, the intellectual 
crossroad of transylvania whose population was still predominantly 
hungarian in the 1950s, has been recently the object of the first system-
atic sociological analysis of a regional security branch by romanian 
historian liviu Pleșa .19 according to his findings, cluj and its sur-
roundings represented one of the most sensitive regional branches due 
to the symbolic importance of the city: Securitate had only 141 staff 
in 1948, but their number rapidly increased to over 600 employees in 
1956 . as Pleșa points out, the first generation of chief-officers shared 
an illegal communist background and battleground experience during 
the Spanish civil war and/or the Second World War, with an over-
whelming presence of hungarian-Jewish born officers .20 It is worth 
mentioning two of them . the first is mihai Patriciu (his real name 
was Grünsperger), the chief of regional security in 1945-51 . he was 
18  B o t t o n i : Sztálin a székelyeknél, op . cit ., p . 159 .
19  P l e ș a : Direcţia regională, op . cit ., pp . 115-145 . 
20  for a complete list see P l e ș a : op . cit ., p . 129 .
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active in Spain and in the french resistance movement, coming back 
to romania in late 1944 . Due to his close relations to former minister 
of Interior teohari Georgescu, he fell in disgrace in 1952 along with his 
protector . even more fascinating appears the case of Wilhelm einhorn, 
born in cojocna on 2 march 1911, who joined the illegal communist 
movement, left for Spain in 1937 and was then imprisoned in france 
along with his later superior, mihai Patriciu . then he succeeded to 
escape to the Soviet union, and later followed the Soviet troops’ march 
into central europe, being recruited as a romanian specialist by the 
nKVD . he returned to cluj in January 1945, where he was involved 
in the organization of the new Popular Police, and in april, the same 
year, was appointed regional chief of Siguranţa . Between 1948 and 
1960 he held key positions in the central apparatus of Securitate, and 
in early 1957 was even sent to hungary under diplomatic cover to help 
reorganize the hungarian secret police and unmask political opponents 
of the freshly established Kádár regime .21 In many respects, Pleșa’s 
work follows earlier researches, such as marius Oprea’s monumental 
inquiry into the romanian communist repressive body, or florian 
Banu’s analysis of the 1950s cadre policy within this institution, who 
underline the poor professional background of Securitate officers .22 at 
the same time, Pleșa made some interesting points regarding the ethnic 
composition of the Securitate staff of cluj region and the importance 
of the hungarian nationalism as a state security issue . according to 
his research, at a regional level the hungarian-born officers made up 
almost one third of the 617 operative staff in 1956;23 their numbers 
sharply declined starting from the first half of the 1960s, when the 
regional branch of cluj was put under the direction of a young, ambi-
tious and well-connected officer named nicolae Pleșiţă . as he claims 
in his memoirs, at his arrival to cluj in 1962 Pleșiţă was shocked to 
find so many first-generation hungarian officers in the state security, 
and immediately started to “romanize” the secret police by remov-
ing hungarians and promoting young romanian-born cadres, who 
21  more information of einhorn in the documentary collection: az 1956-os forrada-
lom és a romániai magyarság 1956-1959 [the revolution of 1956 and the hungarian 
minority in romania 1956-1959] . eds . Stefano B o t t o n i  et al . csíkszereda 2006, p . 37 
and pp . 252-255 (document no . 73) . 
22  marius O p r e a : Banalitatea răului . O istorie a Securităţii în documente [Banality 
of evil . a history of Securitate according to its documents] . Iași 2002 . See also florian 
B a n u : reţeaua informativă a Securităţii în anii ’50: constituire, structură, eficienţă 
[network of information of Securitate in the fifties: formation, structure, efficiency] . 
caiete cnSaS 2 (2008), pp . 7-38 .
23  P l e ș a : Direcţia regională, op . cit ., p . 130 .
1.  KorreKtur
200 Stefano Bottoni
had been educated in a national-communist spirit and perceived the 
hungarians as a collective threat .24 
turning points: 1956 and 1968 in a State security perspective
the 1956 hungarian revolution had an outstanding impact on the in-
ternal dynamics of the communist system of neighbouring romania . 
the unforeseen and dramatic collapse of all main hungarian power 
agencies alarmed the Bucharest party leadership . the first party sec-
retary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej put the army, the intelligence and the 
diplomatic corps on highest alert . In fact, no mass actions or armed 
disturbances took place in romania during the hungarian revolt, not 
even in the most densely hungarian-inhabited regions (a student rally 
held on October 30-31 in timișoara was an exception, not the rule) . the 
reception of the 1956 hungarian revolution by hungarians in neigh-
boring countries was ambivalent . It was hoped that the revolution’s 
democratic and national demands could be met, but it was feared that 
reprisals for failure might spread to all hungarians who had shown 
sympathy . Still, there were some small initiatives, although the rebels 
in Budapest had not voiced any demands for the minority hungarians . 
the roman catholic priest aladár Szoboszlai, based in arad, set about 
organizing a national conspiracy to overthrow the communists and 
achieve a romanian–hungarian confederation . this was soon broken 
up by the romanian secret police, the Securitate, who arrested the 
conspirators . When they came to trial in 1958, ten main conspirators 
were executed and 47 others received sentences ranging from several 
years’ imprisonment to lifelong hard labor .25 Still, the Szoboszlai 
trial remains almost unknown despite being the largest politically 
motivated indictment ever carried out in post-1945 romania . there 
were protests around Oradea and in the Szeklerland, organized by the 
transylvanian hungarian youth associations, which consisted mainly 
of secondary school pupils . Intervention by the romanian communist 
24  Ochii și urechile poporului . convorbiri cu generalul nicolae Pleșiţă [Eyes and 
Ears of the People. talks with general n .P .] . eds . anca V o i c a n , marian O p r e a  . 
București 2001 .
25  Proceedings of the trial have been collected and translated into hungarian by 
Zoltán t ó f a l v i : 1956 erdélyi mártírjai I . a Szoboszlai-csoport [the transylvanian 
martyrs of 1956 . the group Szoboszlai] . marosvásárhely 2007 . On Szoboszlai’s plot at-
tempt see also Stefano B o t t o n i : a hontalan forradalmár – reflexiók Szoboszlay aladár 
ügyére [the homeless revolutionary – reflections to the case of aladár Szoboszlay] . 
In: magyar Kisebbség 3 (2004), pp . 143-160, and i d e m : 1956 romániában: Szoboszlay 
aladár forradalma [the year 1956 in romania: the revolution of aladár Szoboszlay] . 
In: limes 4 (2006), h . 4, pp . 37-50 .
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Party and the Securitate led to severe reprisals, from november 1956 
to the early 1960s, for all who had shown sympathy for the hungarian 
cause . also arrested and condemned were young people, some minors, 
who tried to cross the border into hungary to join the struggle . One fe-
male student from cluj received a ten-year prison sentence for sending 
a letter to a friend into which she had copied the poem “a Word about 
tyranny” by the hungarian writer Gyula Illyés . Initially the reprisals 
were against the whole society, but from 1957 onwards, repression af-
fected an increasing number of professionals and intellectuals accused 
of cosmopolitism, and also teachers, traders, civil servants and even 
party and police officers . furthermore, there could be noticed a grow-
ing shift from indiscriminate purges to more selective and ethnically 
founded punishment, targeting non-romanian minorities, especially 
Jews, transylvanian hungarians – above all their intelligentsia – and 
(to a lesser extent) Germans, Jews and russians/ukrainians . recent 
research indicates the number of people directly affected by the purges 
carried out between 1956 and 1961 to almost 30,000, of who well 
over one tenth were ethnic hungarians .26 But romania’s increasingly 
nationalist course cannot be simply explained by, as some scholars 
did, the “lessons learnt” by the romanian communist leadership in 
1956 .27 Well before nicolae ceaușescu’s seizure of power in 1965, the 
official party line asserted the struggle for economic independence, 
the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation army and an increasing effort 
to “nationalize” the country by limiting the cultural rights of its most 
sizeable ethnic minority, the hungarian one . the main feature of the 
romanian reception of the 1956 hungarian revolution was the launch 
of a severe repression despite no revolutionary events or other seri-
ous threat to state security had occurred . the “ethnic” interpretation 
given by the Bucharest communist leadership to the failed revolution 
26  Stefano B o t t o n i : transilvania roșie . comunismul român și problema naţională 
[the red transylvania . romanian communism and the ethnic problem] 1944-1965 . 
cluj-napoca 2010, p . 250 .
27  On the official interpretation of the 1956 hungarian events by the romanian 
communist authorities see Johanna G r a n v i l l e : Dej-a-Vu: early roots of romania’s 
Independence . In: east european Quarterly 4 (2008), pp . 365-404; temporary triumph 
in timișoara: unrest among romanian Students in 1956 . In: history . the Journal of the 
historical association, 309 (January 2008), pp . 69-93; forewarned is forearmed: how 
the hungarian crisis of 1956 helped the romanian leadership . In: europe-asia Studies 
4 (2010), pp . 615-645; hungary . 101: Seven Ways to avoid a revolution and Soviet Inva-
sion of romania . In: cold War history 1 (2010), pp . 81-106; see also Dragoș P e t r e s c u : 
fifty-Six as an identity shaping experience: the case of the romanian communists . In: the 
1956 revolution and the Soviet Bloc countries: reaction and repercussions . eds . János 
r a i n e r , Katalin S o m l a i  . Budapest 2007, pp . 48-68 .
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in hungary provided also the ground for a more general ideological 
reassessment of the romanian communist regime . the most evident 
signs of that were a radical change of approach in minority issues, the 
struggle for self-distancing from moscow and finally the transforma-
tion of nationalistic policy into a coherent national-communist doctrine 
under nicolae ceaușescu’s leadership . 
the 1956 revolution brought about a change mainly in minority 
policy in romania, where the minority elite had made a more active 
contribution to local and national administration compared to the 
other neighbouring countries . the moral of 1956 for the romanian 
regime was that ethnic hungarians still saw hungary as their mother 
country, despite all the concessions and ostensible privileges given to 
them, and showed no desire to integrate into the romanian state . So 
they had to be classed as an unreliable element even if they posed no 
direct threat to the country’s territorial integrity . In 1959, the hungar-
ian Bolyai university in cluj was merged into the romanian-taught 
Babeș university . In 1960, elementary and secondary schools teaching 
in hungarian began to be merged with romanian schools . In the end, 
on 24 December 1960, the Parliament passed a constitutional amend-
ment altering the region’s boundaries . to be known henceforth as the 
maros–hungarian autonomous region (rmam), its territory and eth-
nic composition were substantially altered . two Szekler districts were 
transferred to the Brașov region, and the districts of Sărmaș, târnăveni 
and luduș, with a hungarian proportion of around 20 percent, were 
annexed to the maros–hungarian autonomous region, making it 
a larger region with about 800,000 inhabitants, of whom 61% were 
hungarian and 35% romanian .28 a politically driven change of elite 
during 1961 replaced most of the hungarian and Jewish functionar-
ies with romanian cadres .29 although the romanian authorities were 
forced by Soviet pressure into agreeing in 1952 to set up the hungarian 
autonomous region, they made good use of it in subsequent years to 
justify pursuing homogenization in other parts of transylvania, mainly 
in the cities, and refusing to recognize the minority’s specific cultural 
and social heritage and needs . classes taught in romanian were added 
to hungarian educational institutions at lower and higher levels . merg-
ers of schools in multi-ethnic communities resulted in parallel sections 
and classes, while romanian-taught courses were introduced into 
hitherto hungarian-taught schools . the direct outcome was a fall in 
enrolment in hungarian-taught secondary education . the nationalist 
28  B o t t o n i : Sztálin a székelyeknél, op . cit ., p . 418 .
29  B o t t o n i : Sztálin a székelyeknél . op . cit ., pp . 422-424 .
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turn of romanian communism was also reflected in new terminology 
referring to non-romanian ethnic groups . In 1959, the term “national 
minority” and the previously frequent references to the “multinational” 
character of the romanian state were ousted by a new definition, “the 
romanian people and the cohabiting national groups” . according to 
party ideologists, “national minority” implied forming a separate cul-
tural nation . the hitherto large number of hungarians working in the 
party and state apparatus found themselves squeezed out, along with 
the Jewish-born officials who were hungarian in culture . from 1957 
onwards, the secret police used blackmail and other methods to start 
a mass recruitment campaign among ethnic hungarians as informers 
on other members of the hungarian community .30 this applied particu-
larly in the arts, the universities and newspaper offices, but it extended 
to factories and state institutions as well . romania’s minority policy 
in the 1960s was guided by the so called nation-building stage in the 
transformation into a communist society . the progressive shift from 
a class-dictatorship toward an ethnicized totalitarian regime was the 
product of the Gheorghiu-Dej era and, as such, it was nothing but the 
natural outcome of a long-standing ideological fouling of communism 
and more traditional state-building ideologies .31
a good mirror of how the political changes penetrated the men-
tality of state security is a comparative analysis of speeches held by 
the minister of Interior, alexandru Drăghici, during the operative 
meetings held throughout the 1950s . In a speech held on 11 february 
1953 in front of the chiefs of the regional branches of the Securitate, 
Drăghici – whose wife was incidentally an ethnic hungarian – blamed 
the poorly coordinated actions taken against “hostile elements” and 
“fugitives”, but made no reference to hungarian “nationalist” threat .32 
thus, individual crimes and “faults” committed by ethnic hungarians 
were explained in strictly ideological terms (criminals must belong to 
the declassed upper class), and individual cases were not explained 
as being part of a larger plot against the romanian communist state . 
30  B o t t o n i : transilvania roșie, op . cit ., pp . 236-248 .
31  the Soviet matrix has been extensively examined by terry m a r t i n : the affirma-
tive action empire . nations and nationalism in the Soviet union 1923-1939 . Itacha, 
london 2001; David B r a n d e n b e r g e r : national Bolshevism . Stalinist mass culture 
and the formation of modern russian national identity 1931-1956 . cambridge mass . 
2002; on the romanian case, see the outstanding biography of ana Pauker by robert 
l e v y : Gloria și decăderea anei Pauker [Glory and decline of a .P .] . Iași 2002; on the 
nexus between the ideological transformation of the romanian communist system and 
the ethnic issue, see Vladimir t i s m ă n e a n u : Stalinism for all Seasons: a political his-
tory of romanian communism . Berkeley 2003 . 
32  acnSaS, fond Documentar, dosar 97, f . 8-15 .
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On the contrary, the general meetings of high officers of the Securitate, 
called on several occasions between 1957 and 1958 were instrumented 
by Drăghici and his colleagues – among whom nicolae ceaușescu, at 
that time the energetic vice-secretary of the cc of the rcP – as a trib-
une to unmask and condemn the alleged infiltration of “fascist” and 
“revisionist” elements into the hungarian minority .33 this new ap-
proach to the hungarian issue was confirmed by the recently published 
“memories” of high-ranking Securitate officer evghenie tănase, written 
during the short-lived liberalization of 1967-68 with a self-defending 
purpose . tănase described the increasing conflicts arisen over security 
risks assessment after 1956 between the centre and the (hungarian-
dominated) regional Securitate office of the hungarian autonomous 
region . according to tănase, colonel Kovács from târgu mureș used 
to stress in his reports that romanian nationalism shall be considered 
as the main security threat, while after the hungarian revolution the 
central apparatus had come to the conclusion that resurgent hungarian 
nationalism had been grossly underappreciated so far, and hungarian 
“fascists” are threatening the socialist state .34 
the late 1950s and the early 1960s brought deep ethnic and cultural 
changes in the composition of the Securitate . as part of a general ef-
fort to get rid of mostly unskilled and ethnically “unreliable” cadres 
whose only merit was illegal activity before 1944, hundreds of first 
generation Securitate officers were pensioned or downgraded with 
administrative measures . hungarian-born Securitate officers did not 
disappear from the scene, but their new generation tended now to 
belong to a new generation of professionals educated at the school of 
romanian communist patriotism, like colonel elemér erdélyi, who 
became chief of Securitate of the newly established Szekler county of 
harghiţa in 1968, and held this position until his replacement with an 
ethnic romanian officer in 1980 .35 another ethnic hungarian, lieuten-
ant colonel alexandru csomós, was appointed in the 1970s assistant 
chief of mureș county Securitate .36 throughout the 1960s, Securitate 
became the first administrative body to “internalise” and practice the 
new national-communist ideology . according to archival sources, 
in his capacity as minister of Interior, Drăghici played an active role 
33  a detailed analysis of the 1957-1958 Securitate meetings in B o t t o n i : transilvania 
roșie, op . cit ., pp . 228-248 .
34  evghenie t ă n a s e : Pseudomemoriile unui general de Securitate [Pseudo-mem-
ories of a Securitate-general] . București 2008, pp . 206-210 .
35  Securitatea . eds . D o b r e  et al ., op . cit ., vol . 2, pp . 124-126 .
36  Ibidem, pp . 189-191: 9 aprilie 1974 – referat de cadre al locotenent-colonelului 
csomos alexandru [9th of april 1974 . lecture by local responsable colonel c .a .] . 
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in the stimulation of socialist patriotism . In his speech delivered to 
a large audience of high-ranking Securitate officers on 17 november 
1964, the minister described security measures undertaken over the 
last two years in order to stop “nationalist propaganda” spilling over 
to romania not only through the Western hungarian emigration, but 
also from a neighbouring socialist ally, Kádár’s hungary .37 Preventive 
work and operative actions against the alleged centres of hungarian 
revisionism (churches, schools, cultural networks) was intensified, 
and special attention was paid to the recruitment of ethnic hungarian 
informers . 
the switch towards an openly discriminative approach was moti-
vated by external factors, such as the bilateral crisis in the relationship 
with the Soviet union which followed the so-called “declaration of 
independence” issued by the rcP in april 1964 on the necessity to 
establish equal relationships between the communist parties of the 
socialist camp . In the meanwhile, romania was reconsidering its 
military and security ties with the other members of the Warsaw Pact . 
after 1948, two long-standing enemies such as the hungarian and the 
romanian secret service had been forced by the international situation 
to start a (mostly informal) mutual cooperation under Soviet guidance . 
throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s, the two security forces 
carried out several joint operations targeting former war criminals, 
nationalist intellectuals, or ordinary people from hungary visiting 
relatives and friends in romania . Bilateral diplomatic relationships 
deteriorated after the “declaration of independence”, and so did the 
intelligence cooperation between the two ministries of Interior, which 
thus came to a long-lasting stop .38
after 1956 and 1964, the third and most decisive crisis to worsen 
the perception of the hungarian minority by the romanian state se-
curity came along in 1968, with the Prague Spring and the subsequent 
37  Securitatea . Structuri – cadre . Obiective și metode . eds . florica D o b r e  et al ., 
cit ., vol . 1, pp . 615-651: expunerea ministrului afacerilor Interne, alexandru Drăghici, 
referitoare la munca organelor de securitate in perioada octombrie 1963 - octombrie 
1964, cu prilejul ședinţei organizate la minister cu toate cadrele de conducere din apa-
ratul central si regional maI . Stenograma ședinţei din 17 noiembrie 1964 [explanation 
of the minister of the Interior, a .D ., relating to the task of Securitate from Oct . 1963 to 
Oct . 1964, on the occasion of the conference of the minister and all head cadres of the 
central and regional offices by the ministry of the Interior . Stenogram of the meeting 
on 17th of november 1964] .
38  On the romanian-hungarian intelligence cooperation see Stefano B o t t o n i : 
“Baráti együttműködés”: a magyar-román állambiztonsági kapcsolatok [“friendly 
co-operation”: the relations of the hungarian and romanian intelligence agencies] 
(1945-1982) . In: történelmi Szemle 2 (2011), pp . 235-257 . 
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invasion of czechoslovakia by the uSSr and his allies . as romanian 
and international scholars claim, after the 1968 czechoslovak crisis, 
the romanian authorities made further steps toward a new security 
doctrine focusing on national independence and territorial protection, 
setting up a special “anti-KGB” military unit (um 110) .39 the main 
targets of this unit were the uSSr and the neighboring hungary, whose 
leadership was suspected to fuel popular nationalism over the sensible 
issue of transylvania . During the 1970s, formally recorded but highly 
ineffective security cooperation agreed between the two ministries of 
Interior in 1972 could not cancel the emerging conflicts . 
as the most update scholarship has pointed out, in the late 1960s 
the intellectual debates on the condition of hungarian communities 
abroad had re-emerged in the hungarian public sphere after almost 
twenty years of self-imposed silence, and played an outstanding role in 
the formation of the first opposition platforms to the Kádár regime .40 
the interest many hungarians showed in their co-ethnics living in the 
neighbouring countries became a source of increasing annoyance to the 
romanian authorities, who considered every word spent on this topic 
as an intolerable intervention in a sovereign state’s internal affairs . Since 
hungary was a socialist country and a member of the Warsaw Pact, 
enjoying strong support from moscow in its “national manoeuvres” 
39  See marius O p r e a : moștenitorii Securităţii [the heritage of the Securitate] . 
București 2004; lavinia B e t e a : 21 august 1968 – apoteoza lui ceaușescu [21st of august 
1968 – the apotheosis of c .] . Iași 2009; for a more detailed account based on romanian 
and east German sources Stejărel O l a r u , Georg h e r b s t r i t t : Stasi și Securitatea . 
București 2005, especially pp . 109-118 . according to larry l . Watts, the post-1968 in-
filtration of the Soviet Bloc’ security services into romania would have been part of 
a larger plan aimed at destabilyzing the country . larry l . W a t t s : ferește-mă, Doamne, 
de prieteni! războiul clandestin al blocului sovietic cu românia [Save me, lord, from 
friends . the secret war between Soviet Bloc and romania] . București 2011 .
40  Katalin m i k l ó s s y : manoeuvres of national Interest . Internationalism and na-
tionalism in the emerging Kádárist criticism of romania 1968-1972 . helsinki 2003; 
martin m e v i u s : the Politics of history . romanian-hungarian historical disputes 
and the genesis of the “history of transylvania” . In: entanglements and compari-
sons: hungary and romania beyond national narratives . eds . anders B l o m q v i s t , 
constantin I o r d a c h i , Balázs t e r e n c s e n y i  . Ort??? Jahr??? (Stanford university 
Press, forthcoming) . See also the general overview by nándor B á r d i : tény és való . 
a budapesti kormányzatok és a határon túli magyarság kapcsolattörténete [real facts . 
the history of the relationship between the governments in Budapest and the hungar-
ians abroad] . Pozsony, Kalligram 2004; on the hungarian-romanian relations György 
f ö l d e s : magyarország, románia és a nemzeti kérdés [hungary, romania and the 
nationality-problems] 1956-1989 . Budapest 2007; a more theoretical approach in János 
G y u r g y á k : ezzé lett magyar hazátok? a magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus 
története [What has become your country? the history of the hungarian national idea 
and of the hungarian nationalism] . Budapest 2007, pp . 501-534 . 
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against the romanian national-communism, the emergence of an open 
conflict between two allies over the status of the hungarian minority 
in transylvania was out of question . In the 1970s and the 1980s, the 
romanian security forces came to regard hungary and the whole hun-
garian community in transylvania as a main security threat . Ignoring 
the rules of engagement of the Warsaw Pact countries, which forbade 
hostile intelligence activity on another member state’s territory, the 
romanian security services started to infiltrate the political, cultural 
and economic structures of hungary . although cautious reaction of 
the Budapest authorities to the romanian offensive posture aimed to 
reassure moscow about the good will and the accountability of the 
Kádár regime, no gesture of appeasement could prevent the further 
worsening of the bilateral relations in the first half of the 1980s . then, 
the hungarian minority in transylvania suffered demographic losses 
due to assimilation and growing emigration, becoming the hostage of 
an unprecedented conflict among the two socialist countries .
collaboration as a sacrifice to the community:  
the case of Imre mikó 
after sketching a general picture of the complex relationship between 
the romanian state security and the hungarian minority, I would con-
clude this study by touching upon the still very sensitive issue of the 
collaboration of a great number of ethnic hungarians with Securitate . 
I will try to answer why they accepted to help a regime which did not 
favor them, and sometimes openly discriminated minorities, through 
the case of one of the most outstanding transylvanian hungarian 
intellectuals of the xxth century, Imre mikó .41 he was born in Koloz-
svár/cluj in 1911 from a distinguished transylvanian family, whose 
members since 1848 had held almost uninterruptedly the position 
of curator-general within the transylvanian unitarian church . he 
started writing for several periodicals in the early 1930s, when he was 
one of the very few ethnic hungarian students to attend the faculty of 
law of the newly established romanian-language university of cluj, 
where he graduated . Between 1934 and 1936, he completed his studies 
in international law in Budapest and Paris, and then in 1937, at only 
26, started a brilliant political career as chief of the Bucharest office 
41  the only comprehensive, though incomplete biography of mikó is Sándor B a -
l á z s : Imre mikó: Élet- és pályakép . Kéziratok, dokumentumok [the life and the career 
of Imre mikó . manuscripts and documents] (1933-1968) . Kolozsvár 2003; see also ernő 
Gáll’s earlier portrait in: Imre m i k ó : Változatok egy témra . tanulmányok [Variations 
on a theme . Studies] . Bukarest 1981, pp . 9-23 . 
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of the hungarian national Party of romania . after 1938, when King 
charles II introduced a personal dictatorship through the dissolution 
of all existing parties, mikó remained in the capital as general secretary 
and chief of the legal office of the hungarian minority’s new umbrella 
organization, the hungarian People’s community . In October 1940, 
after the Second Vienna award gave back northern transylvania to 
hungary, he left Bucharest, where he had been working since 1939 as 
the secretary of the hungarian Popular community, the hungarian 
branch of the national renaissance front . By then the sober lawyer, 
who could speak an excellent romanian along with english, German 
and french, had already become the most influent hungarian politi-
cian in transylvania . In 1941, Prime minister Pál teleki asked mikó 
to become a member of the hungarian parliament and to serve his 
community as the chief of the Budapest office of the transylvanian 
Party . he fulfilled this duty until march 1944, when he resigned in 
sign of protest against the German military invasion of hungary and 
returned to his native town .42
a decisive turning point in his life came after the romanian/Soviet 
joint liberation of Kolozsvár/cluj, on 13 October 1944, when based on 
the lists preliminarily drafted by the Soviet security services; he was 
arrested along with hundreds of prominent members of the hungarian 
community and deported to a forced labor camp in the uSSr . Dur-
ing the 4-years captivity, he learned russian and became a political 
responsible for his camp . after his return to cluj, in 1948, the newly 
learnt language proved essential for his survival: despite being a well-
known bourgeois politician, he was one of the few persons in cluj to 
have good command of russian, and so could become a teacher of 
russian at his former unitarian college . ten years after, the minis-
try of Interior ordered to dismiss all “politically unreliable” cadres 
from the education system . the punishment affected mikó as well, 
whose reactionary past became the object of long investigations, dur-
ing which he was forced to work for several years as a storekeeper of 
the regional editorial trust, being promoted later to manager of the 
university bookshop . 
42  mikó’s involvement into the hungarian political life is broadly documented in 
nándor B á r d i ’s introduction “egy girondista erdélyben” [a girondist in transsylvania] 
to Imre m i k ó : az erdélyi falu és a nemzetiségi kérdés [the transylvanian village and 
the nationality problem] . csíkszereda 1998, pp . 5-36 . On mikó’s political and intellectual 
role as an authoritative member of the hungarian parliament between 1941 and 1944, 
see Gábor e g r y : az erdélyiség “színeváltozása” . Kísérlet az erdélyi Párt ideológiájá-
nak és identitáspolitikájának elemzésére [the “color change” of the transylvanians . 
an attempt to analyze the ideology and identity politics of erdélyi Párt/transylvanian 
Party] 1940-1944 . Budapest 2008 . 
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his political and social rehabilitation came in parallel with the evo-
lution of the romanian communist regime . In the second half of the 
1960s, during the first, and relatively liberal, years in power of nicolae 
ceaușescu, mikó regained his former status of curator-general of the 
unitarian church, a position he filled between 1964 and 1969, and 
again after 1973 . In this capacity, in august 1968 he organized the 
international celebration of the 400th anniversary of the unitarian 
movement, celebrated with great pomp in cluj as a sign of openness of 
the romanian communist state towards a minority cult . after february 
1970 he became one of the editors and most influential staff members 
of the newly established Kriterion publishing house specialized on 
publishing literature of minority communities, a position he covered 
until his death . 
from 1948 to the day of his death, in march 1977, mikó’s professional 
and private life was accurately monitored by the Securitate, which 
mobilized several dozens of officers and secret informers to unveil 
the smallest nuances of the ordinary life of a “declassed” element 
under the communist regime . the Securitate archives in Bucharest 
(acnSaS) hold an impressive ten-volume collection documenting the 
relationship between mikó and the state security . Six of them contain 
more than 1300 pages of operative investigation carried out on mikó 
(fond Informativ), while the other four (734 pages) testify mikó’s 
secret cooperation with Securitate . he was recruited three times as an 
informer after 1948, when the secret police registered his comeback 
from the uSSr and started spying on him .43 In february 1952, under 
physical and psychological constraint, he signed a cooperation agree-
ment, but gave only little information about the pre-1944 activity of 
former colleagues and friends belonging to the liberal-conservative 
political side . In 1955, he suffered a short arrest, possibly motivated 
by his refusal to continue collaboration . after his release, he signed 
another agreement . following the 1956 hungarian revolution mikó 
did not accept to speak about who had been supportive of the uprising 
among his colleagues and students, and wrote the first party secretary 
of cluj region, asking for rehabilitation and denouncing his precarious 
condition as a police informer . Securitate reacted nervously to this 
rather unusual step, and after eliminating him from the collaborators’ 
network (January 1957), they put him under general surveillance as 
a former leader of a “fascist party” . In September 1958 mikó also lost 
his job as a russian language teacher, and the state security pressure 
increased on him, but he had become so prudent and suspicious, that 
43  mikó’s personal file in the romanian secret police archives: acnSaS, fond In-
formativ, dosar 235727 (6 vol .), and fond reţea, dosar 182274 (4 vol .) .
1.  KorreKtur
210 Stefano Bottoni
all the attempts of the Securitate to provoke political debates among 
mikó and his acquaintances spying on him proved to be unsuccessful . 
the most interesting phase of his collaboration was definitely the 
third and last one (1972-77) . When he regained all ecclesiastical honors 
and a widely respected job as assistant editor of the main hungarian-
language publishing house, mikó again had to come to terms with the 
Securitate . this time, the stake was not his personal freedom like in the 
1950s, but the broadly-shared idea of intellectuals of “paying their duty 
to the nation” by serving their community even at the price of personal 
sacrifice . On the one hand, Securitate allowed mikó to travel several 
times to the West (1972, one-month trip to West-Germany and austria; 
1973, one-month trip to the uS; 1976, one-month trip to West-Germany, 
austria and Switzerland) . the possibility for a respected member of 
the hungarian “high society” to travel in Western countries, certainly 
not suspected of communist sympathy for his political past and cul-
tural background, would dismiss widespread allegations among the 
hungarian émigrés of mistreatment of the hungarian minority in 
transylvania . the romanian secret police helped mikó to get in contact 
with the Western hungarian emigration, using him, codenamed since 
1973 as informer “micu” or “marcu”, as a channel of influence and 
disinformation . Information he gave through detailed written reports 
on the attitude of the Western emigration towards transylvania and 
the minority problems was rated of highest relevance, and after his last 
mission in 1976, he personally discussed the outcome with the chief of 
the cluj county Securitate office, General constantin Ioana, an utmost 
rare privilege for an informer . throughout the files, one can follow 
both the general evolution of the political system from open brutality 
to sophisticated manipulation techniques, and a former opponent’s 
personal evolution from political and moral rejection of the communist 
regime to a critical conformation to it . the frightened and blackmailed 
petty informer of the 1950s by the mid-1970s had become a qualified 
source, whose diplomatic and analytic capacity was appreciated very 
much by the secret police .
What may have motivated the collaboration of mikó with a system 
he ideologically never adhered to? In the 1950s, his only aim was to 
survive Stalinism and to avoid another fall to poverty for his large 
family as it had happened during his long absence between 1944 and 
1948 . the case is rather different when we come to the 1970s . then 
Imre mikó had an excellent reason for accepting to collaborate with 
the romanian communist security services . as a skilled lawyer and 
politician, he was well aware of the kind of tasks and compromises 
such a cooperation implied, and also of the moral borderline he could 
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not cross . the first and most important goal of his travels to the West 
was to strike up (or re-establish) relationships with the hungarian 
diaspora and to show that the transylvanian hungarian community 
still exists, produces valuable culture and – at the end of the day – it is 
worth being supported morally, politically and economically . he knew 
or felt on the ground how suspicious the Western emigration was of 
anyone coming from the “iron curtain”; as one of the few trustworthy 
persons representing abroad the transylvanian hungarian community 
under ceaușescu, mikó accepted the rules of play set by the Securitate 
in order to fulfill a higher ethical expectation: staying at the service of 
his community .
Imre mikó was not the only prominent member of the hungarian 
minority to face after the Second World War the moral dilemma to 
resist or rather seek to integrate into the romanian communist state . 
many think that to cooperate with the central and local authorities 
was inevitable in order to physically preserve the community and 
avoid even harder repression, cultural assimilation or expulsion from 
romania, even if the successfully uncompromising stance towards 
the national-communist regime of the roman catholic Bishop Áron 
márton’s shows that other options were possible, as well . then, a closer 
study of the state security’s perspective over the minority question 
gains importance to understand which paradigms and which rational 
choices marked the romanian minority policy throughout the com-
munist era .
Zusammenfassung 
 
Müsste deutsch sein!!! Integration, collaboration, resistance . 
the hungarian minority in transylvania and  
the romanian State Security Police
this paper proposes to look into the strained relationship between 
the communist State Security and the most sizeable ethnic minority 
in romania, namely the hungarian community of transylvania, com-
prising roughly 1 .5 million people . 
Professional historians dealing with ethnic relations in communist 
romania still keep looking into the pernicious effects of self-victim-
ization and traumatizing collective memory suffered by minority 
groups during the 1980s . making use of previously inaccessible sources 
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from the files of the former Secret Police archives, it is now possible 
to challenge the widely shared view that central and local romanian 
authorities had been the only agents responsible for the maltreat-
ment of minorities, exonerating former collaborators as victims of an 
infernal system .
In this paper a new methodology is set forward, allowing to re-
constitute historical research on interethnic relations in transylvania 
by analyzing not only the actual policies conducted by the roma-
nian authorities, but also behind-the-curtain manoeuvres affecting 
organizational and ideological changes carried out by Securitate . the 
fundamental shift in attitude of the romanian Secret Police from strict 
internationalism and class repression to open support of ‘soft’ ethnic 
cleansing can be considered as one of the most interesting features 
among the more general substantial changes which the romanian 
communist regime underwent from the late 1950s onwards .  
rezumat 
 
Integrare, colaborare, rezistenţă .  
minoritatea maghiară din transilvania  
și Securitatea română
In această conferinţă este analizată relaţia dintre Securitatea în statul 
comunist și minoritatea etnică cea mai numeroasă din românia (în 
număr de 1,5 milioane) – cea a comunităţii maghiare în transilvania . 
Istorici de profesie, ocupându-se de relaţii etnice în românia co-
munistă, continuă să releveze autovictimizarea, trauma memoriei 
colective, așa cum au fost ele construite în anii optzeci de grupuri mi-
noritare . Prin cercetarea unor documente din arhivele poliţiei secrete, 
inaccesibile în trecut, acum este posibilă contestarea acestui punct de 
vedere, conform căruia numai autorităţile românești locale și centrale 
ar fi fost responsabile pentru tratamentul opresiv al minorităţilor, prin 
care foști colaboratori ar fi fost victime ale unui mecanism infernal . 
Prin această conferinţă dorim să contribuim la o reînnoire meto-
dologică a cercetărilor istoriei relaţiilor interetnice în transilvania, 
analizând nu numai politicile concrete ale autorităţilor românești, ci 
și schimbările organizatorice și ideologice efectuate de Securitate în 
secret . remarcabilă în cadrul schimbărilor generale în anii cincizeci 
târzii a fost trecerea Securităţii de la internaţionalism și conceptul luptei 
de clasă la sprijinirea unei politici de blândă epurare etnică .  
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